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Laura Denenga ‘11 – Social Science 
 
Female Wages and Occupational Advance under Black Economic Empowerment 
in South Africa  
 
Abstract 
Using South African Census Data from the IPUMS international database, this study examines 
the effect of the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy on the South African gender wage 
disparity. The policy launched by the ANC party in 2003 aims to not only address the racial 
disparities created by Apartheid, but to create employment equity for women and encourage their 
advance into managerial positions. This study uses an OLS regression to study the annual 
income of females before and after BEE was implemented. The results show the wage gap 
between men and women to have decreased by 1.39%. Furthermore, when looking at 
occupational advance, the results show women to be 3.37 percentage points more likely to be in 
managerial positions after the policy. 
 
I.  Introduction 
Following World War II, countries all across Africa slowly gained independence, leaving 
newly formed governments with the task of addressing the vast racial inequalities that were 
created by the European colonies. In South Africa, 1994 marked the end of a fifty-year-old racial 
segregation policy called Apartheid. At the end of Apartheid, the control of businesses and land 
ownership typically rested in the hands of the white minority. For instance, despite being four 
times as large, the black population was allocated 13% of the land compared to the 87% 
belonging to the white population in the 1970s (Leonard, 1984). However, the same income 
inequality has also been observed between males and females and it is recorded that two out of 
three discouraged work seekers in South Africa are women (Nding’u, 2010). When the new 
ruling party, the ANC, first implemented the empowerment policies, pressure was put on them to 
also include the advancement of women. The most prolific policy to date that has been able to 
address these multiple disenfranchised groups is the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Act. 
This policy that was implemented in 2003 appeals directly to businesses to develop viable 
empowerment models based on a 100 point system that is highlighted in Table I.   
 The government has established the ‘7 BEE Elements’ which are a set of criteria for 
companies to address in regards to minorities. The criteria include; ownership; management 
control; employment equity; skills development; preferential procurement; enterprise 
development; and socio-economic development. The companies are then graded to give a total 
out of 100 and are consequently given a level grading with Level 1 being the highest 
achievement and companies earning less than 30 points not being credited at all. In order to 
create the incentive, the South African government has been know to contract companies with 
the highest scores, consequently giving them a competitive edge. Government charters have 
determined target employment levels for women and specify that companies must have a 
percentage of women in management. For instance, the financial services charter targets that 4% 
of executive managers in a company should be women (International Finance Cooperation, 
2011). Consequently, by hiring women and promoting them to higher positions companies have 
the potential of earning additional points on their scorecard. This paper examines whether BEE 
has in fact facilitated women’s progress in the work place using both an OLS regression and a 
linear probability model.         
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 In order to assess the income of women before and after the policy, I perform an OLS 
regression with the natural log of annual income as the dependent variable. The results suggest 
that females earned, on average, 43.9% less than males before the policy and this wage gap 
decreases by 1.39% post 2003. The second methodology looked at occupational advance of 
women using a linear probability model.  The results suggest that, when compared to men, 
before BEE women had been approximately 1% point less likely to be in managerial positions 
but they are 2.4 percentage points more likely to be managers post policy.   
 
II. Black Economic Empowerment 
Apartheid, which comes from the Afrikaans word for apartness, was a political slogan of 
the leading National Party in the 1940s and later became an institutionalized practice in the 
1950s after a number of laws were introduced. Primarily, the Group Areas Act (1950) assigned 
races to different residential and business sections in urban areas. Later, the Land Acts of 1954 
and 1955 restricted nonwhite residences to specific areas. These laws officially restricted 
nonwhites from desirable land, particular job categories and high-level education. The resulting 
disparity between Whites and Blacks is represented in Table II. 
However, led by President F.W de Klerk, 1990 saw the National Party reform and 
legalize formally banned black congress and release imprisoned black leaders. Now, with 
apartheid laws officially dismantled, new laws have been introduced to try and reverse the 
ramifications of the early National Party legislations. Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) was 
first implemented to increase the share of workers in disenfranchised groups that manage, own 
and control enterprises (Mpahlwa, 2004).  However, this first focus attracted a lot criticism as 
observers felt the policy was being used to only benefit an elite few (Speckman, A, 2011). 
Consequently additional goals have been established that aim to improve lower income 
individuals as well as the long-standing gender disparity.  However, much of the BEE media 
attention has been focused on the equity sales to black empowerment groups and black investors 
(Sartorius and Botha, 2008). The emphasis on equity transfers is represented in the literature as 
most studies have looked directly at these transactions. Sartorius and Botha (2008) conducted a 
detailed survey of 62 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). The authors 
wanted to measure the participation of firms in BEE transactions, understand the motivation for 
participating firms, and trace the source of funding for the transactions.  They found the majority 
of companies transferred less than the required 25% of equity to BEE partners. They also found 
that funding for the equity transfers came from third party sources or the respondent firms 
themselves.  As for motivations, the authors found participating firms supported the social 
objectives behind BEE and only considered the profit potential second.  
Using data from Business Map Black Economic Empowerment Database, Jackson et al 
(2005) looked at how the price of a firm’s equity changed after they announced their BEE 
transaction. These authors hypothesized a BEE announcement could have two opposing effects. 
They first hypothesized that the announcement of black economic empowerment deals would 
result in positive media attention, awarding them a competitive advantage that would then lead to 
a positive reevaluation of the firm’s market value of equity. The authors also argue that 
participating in BEE deals gives firms the benefit of key social and economic contacts of the 
black empowerment groups and access to opportunities provided by the public sector.  
 On the other hand, the authors were aware of the possibility of firms being negatively 
reevaluated after a BEE announcement. Investors could have anticipated that white managers 
will be replaced with less qualified minority managers, resulting in mismanagement of firms. 
2
Colgate Academic Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 9
http://commons.colgate.edu/car/vol9/iss1/9
  206 
They find results are in favor of their first hypothesis, suggesting that, on average, announcing 
firms experienced a 2% increase in market value of equity amongst announcing firms. 
Furthermore, this increase in equity value increased proportionally to the equity transferred. 
Whilst the paper by Jackson et al shows favorable results for some BEE critiques, it stirs up 
another query; that BEE has only been beneficial for the highly educated, politically connected 
few. Consequently, instead of just focusing on those directly involved in BEE equity 
transactions, this present study assesses the effect of the policy on the labor market, paying 
particular attention to women.  
 
III. U.S Affirmative Action as a Model 
BEE has often been compared to the U.S Affirmative Action policy as it equally 
addresses racial and gender inequalities that pervade the country.  In America’s not too distant 
past, Affirmative Action was a hotly debated subject and a number of papers were written that 
addressed policy effects on the labor market. Affirmative Action, like BEE, was a combination 
of legislation and court rulings that tried to erase the differences between women and men, 
minorities and non-minorities. Since 1961, there have been a number of key executive orders, 
regulations and court decisions that encapsulated the program. First, the executive order, 10925, 
required government contractors not to discriminate against employees or job applicants. In 
1964, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act established the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) to monitor compliance.  Many economists have focused their studies by 
comparing the wages of non government and government contracted companies that were 
directly subject to governmental penalties and monitored by the EEOC.  In 1967, the executive 
order was extended to include women and many economists studied the gender wage gaps 
thereafter.           
 James  Smith and Finis Welch (1984) created summary statistics observing minority 
employment over a 15-year period. Using data from the Current Population Survey (from 1967 
to 1981),  the authors first looked at the wages of minorities relative to the economically 
dominant group and found a narrowing wage disparity between black and white men as the wage 
of black men was 75% of the white men in 1981, compared to the 60% in the late 60s. They also 
found that amongst whites, there has been, quite remarkably, no change in relative male and 
female wages. The contrast between the black women and white women is most significant. In 
1967, the average black woman earned 74% of the wage of a similarly employed white woman 
and yet the authors found complete racial wage parity at the time of the study in 1984.   
 Next, the authors studied to see if EEOC monitoring significantly altered the location of 
minority employment in the labor market, anticipating that minority representation and 
occupational level should expand more for government contracted firms that were required to 
report to the EEOC. They found that all four demographics showed larger percentages of 
managers and professionals after the order, however, minorities showed a more rapid 
improvement. The proportion of blacks that self reported as managers or professionals expanded 
threefold between 1966 and 1980. Furthermore, in 1966, 1 out of 5 black male managers in the 
dataset were employed by monitored firms. However, by 1980 nearly half of the black managers 
in the data set were employed by monitored firms. For black females it was 1 in 5 managers that 
were employed by monitored firms and this ratio increased to 2:3 by 1980. One suggestion the 
authors provided was these results could also be from the reclassification of jobs as the 
proportion of white males in managerial positions also increased, suggesting in general the 
monitored section became more managerial than professional over the time period.  
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 Jonathan Leonard (1984) focused his research on whether Affirmative Action was able to 
move minorities up the job ladder. Leonard constructs an occupational index for each 
demographic group and compared its growth across contractor and non-contractor 
establishments. Leonard’s index weighted the proportion of members of a given demographic 
group in an occupation. In his equations for occupational growth he controls for employment 
growth by demographic grou He posited that if affirmative action has led to black or females 
being employed in higher paying jobs, then this index should increase faster at contractor firms. 
Leonard found that black male’s occupational index increased by 2% between 1974 to 1980 for 
non-contractor firms, and an additional 1% for reviewed establishments. Like Leonard my 
interest was to assess the notion of occupational upgrade, however, I use a linear probability 
model to test the likelihood females were found in managerial positions before and after the 
policy were implemented. 
Leonard continued his studies in 1996, this time extending his work to look at wage 
disparities in the 1980s, estimating wage equations by industry and city by sampling 41 
industries and 113 cities. Leonard here asked how the pay of women, blacks, Hispanics, Asians 
and Native Americans was related to non Hispanic whites with similar productive characteristics. 
He found that between 1980 and 1990, the wage gap for women declined by 7.6 percentage 
points but that wage gaps deteriorated by 2.5 percentage points for blacks and by 4.1 percentage 
points for Native Americans.  He also found that changes in wages varied greatly across cities 
and that reductions in the wage gap for one group was not always matched by similar reductions 
in another group, disproving the claim that some cities reduced discrimination across the board. 
As for the industry level analysis, Leonard found relative wages of women, blacks and Native 
Americans moved in tandem with their respective employee share across the industry. Similarly, 
I will extend my work to address gender wage disparities in South Africa using an OLS model.  
 
III. Data and Specification 
I use South African individual level census data from the year 1996, 2001 and 2007 
retrieved from the IPUMS international website and published by the Minnesota Population 
Centre (2010).  The data included 1.5 million observations of the employed working age 
respondents (ages 18-65), with variables for technical, geographical, constructed family 
interpersonal relationships, demographic, nativity, birthplace, ethnicity, language, education, 
work and income variables. Because income was given at the nominal level, the South African 
CPI was used (Statistics South Africa, 2011) to convert these values to real values. Summary 
statistics for each year are included in Appendix Table III and Table IV includes the distribution 
of employees in by occupation. 
In order to analyze the effect of BEE on women, I estimate a pooled wage equation with 
ln(income) as the dependent variable. 
 ln(income)푖푡=훽0+훽1푛표푛푤ℎ푖푡푒푖+훽22001+훽32007+훽4푛표푛푤ℎ푖푡푒∗2007+훽5푦
푟푠푒푑푢푖푡+훽6푒푥푝푒푟푖푡+훽7푓푒푚푎푙푒푖+훽8푓푒푚푎푙푒∗2007+훽9푓푒푚푎푙푒푐ℎ푢5푖+훽10푠푝표
푢푠푒푖+훽11푚표푡ℎ푒푟푖+훽12푛푐ℎ푖푙푑푟푒푛푖+푢푖푡 
 
I also use proxies for productivity including the number of years an individual was 
educated (yrsedu) and their years of experience (exper). I then extended the model by including a 
number of variables that explain a female’s ability to work by including a dummy variable if she 
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is married (spouse) or has a child under the age of five (childu5), also including an interaction 
term; female*chu5 in the equation.  I also include a dummy variable to consider if the 
respondent’s mother lives at home (mother), which is perhaps influential on the ability of a 
woman to have a career and still raise her children. Lastly, for one regression, I specified the 
model including provincial dummy variables. South Africa is divided into the nine different 
provinces that are included in Table IV. Each province has its own government and unique 
economy that could influence the results of the study and so, I control for the provinces using 
Limpopo as the reference group.  
Next, I addressed the issue of occupational advance using a linear probability model. To 
carry out this analysis, I created a dummy variable, managers that took a value of one for 
legislators, seniors, managers and professionals. The remaining occupations that were labeled 
nonmanagers are listed in Table V. 
I subsequently regressed the manager variable on the same independent variables as before. 
 manager푖  =훽0+훽1푛표푛푤ℎ푖푡푒푖+훽22001+훽32007+훽4푛표푛푤ℎ푖푡푒∗2007+훽5푦푟
푠푒푑푢푖푡+훽6푒푥푝푒푟푖푡+훽7푓푒푚푎푙푒푖+훽8푓푒푚푎푙푒∗2007+훽9푓푒푚푎푙푒푐ℎ푢5푖+훽10푠푝표
푢푠푒푖+훽11푚표푡ℎ푒푟푖+훽12푛푐ℎ푖푙푑푟푒푛푖+푢푖푡 
 
IV Results 
 
The results for the OLS regression are shown in Appendix Table VI, columns I, II and 
III. Column III of Tables 5 and contains the key results. All coefficients were found to be 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The reference group for this regression was 
white men. Results show the variables to have the expected positive coefficient.  The coefficients 
on the non-white and nonwhite2007 variable were large, therefore, I convert the estimates as 
follows: 
 
푒훽푖-−1=훽푖 
 
Therefore, nonwhites earned, on average, 62.7% less than whites before the policy. After the 
policy nonwhites earned, on average, 74.6% than whites, showing an increasing wage disparity. 
Years of education and years of experience are all positively correlated to the annual income. 
Results also show that females earned, on average, 43.9% less than men before the policy and 
this wage gap decreased by 1.39%. There were a few counterintuitive results:  the coefficient on 
female with children under the age of five had a positive coefficient with women with children 
under the age of five earning 4.01% more than those without. However, reading van der 
Westhuizen et al’s survey on the South African labor force (2007), we learn women ages 23-34 
had the biggest share in the total labor force growth. This is the age group where women are 
most likely to have young children and could explain how these two trends are related. It was 
also counterintuitive that having a mother present in the house decreased the average income.  I 
found the positive coefficient on the rural variable to also be counterintuitive. The effects of 
urban vs. rural in South Africa on wages has two dichotomous effects. On one hand, rural areas, 
without central business locations and an abundance of employment opportunities should depress 
wages for rural observations. However, the proliferation of townships around urban areas must 
also be considered as they usually house some of the lowest socio economic groups, which 
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would explain rural areas having, on average, higher salaries of 38.7%.       
 When evaluating occupational upgrade (Table VII, column III), we see a reverse in the 
rural coefficient; living in the rural areas decreases the probability of being a manager by 1.28 
percentage points. This result is supported by the fact that rural areas are less likely to have job 
establishments that would have legislators, managers and professionals even though their income 
could be comparable, the job type and occupations is likely to be different. Results for nonwhites 
tell a similar tale as the income regression; nonwhites were less likely to be in managerial 
positions by 12 percentage points and about 17.5 percentage points less likely after policy 
change. Females again experienced an improvement as they were less likely to be managers than 
white males by 0.92 percentage points but 2.4 percentage points more likely to be managers after 
the policy. Results also show that Limpopo employees are more likely to be managers than any 
other province. 
 
V. Conclusion  
The results indicate that, thus far, BEE has had a positive, statistically significant impact 
on the wages of female employees and there is also female occupational upgrading as the 
likelihood that women are managers increased after the policy. Other suspected determinants of 
women’s ability to work had opposite effects than expected with females with children under the 
age of five having an increased annual income than those without.     
 The results for nonwhites are not positive and in fact an increased income inequality is 
experienced between whites and nonwhites. These results were the most surprising and may 
support the outcry that the effects of BEE are not being experienced in the labor market and only 
by the elite.  The province level data showed wages to be higher in Gauteng, North West and the 
Western Cape than the control group, Limpopo. However, the linear probability model showed 
Limpopo had the highest probability of having employees in managerial positions.    
 By taking a closer look at the labor market, these results add to the literature on Black 
Economic Empowerment. The results show the policy to be effective thus far for women 
showing them to be more likely to be mangers than men after the policy. However, the effects 
have not extended to the wage disparity, although the wage gap has decreased, it still shows 
women to earn considerably less than men. For nonwhites, there seams to be a growing income 
inequality which is of a concern. This information might help governments reevaluate their 
scorecards to target areas that have seen the least improvement. Lastly, this study was limited by 
the sample as only employed people were included and I couldn’t analyze the trends in labor 
force participation in relation to BEE. As a result, further insights can be gained from 
incorporating the 2011 South African Census data once it is published at the end of this year.  
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Appendix   
Table I. The 7 BEE Elements  and  Score card (BEESA Consulting, 2011) 
Criteria  Point Value 
Ownership 20 
Management Control  10 
Employment Equity 15 
Skills Development 15 
Preferential Procurement 20 
Enterprise Development 15 
Socio- Economic Development 5 
 100 
 
 
Score  Level  Recognized 
100 1 135% 
85-100 2 125% 
75-85 3 110% 
65-75 4 100% 
55-65 5 80% 
45-55 6 60% 
40-45 7 50% 
30-40 8 10% 
<30 NC 0% 
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Table II. South African Racial Disparity 1970s (Leonard, 1980) 
 Black  White 
Population 19 million 4.5 million 
Land Allocation 13  percent 87percent 
Share of National Income < 20 percent 75 percent 
Ratio of average earnings 1 14 
Min taxable income 360 Rands 750 Rands 
Doctor/population 1/44,000 1/400 
Infant Mortality Rate 20 percent (urban) 
40 percent (rural) 
2.7 percent 
Annual Expenditure on 
education per pupil 
$45 $696 
Teacher/ Pupil Ratio 1/60 1/22 
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Table III. Summary Statistics  
year Average 
age 
 
Female  Male Race Mean 
income 
(Rands)  
Years 
educated  
1996 36.8 282,575 
(40%) 
420,776(60%) White  R739506 11.8 
    Black 
African 
R201307 7.10 
    Coloured  R379037 8.10 
    Asian  R401297 10.4 
2001 37.5 296,903(43%) 398,579(57%) White  R103666 12.0 
    Black 
African 
R19490 7.78 
    Coloured  R25839 8.68 
    Asian  R52929 10.9 
2007 38.0 83,595(43%) 111,685(57%) White  R1462736 12.6 
    Black 
African 
R551008 8.53 
    Coloured  R947925 11.7 
    Asian  R1217988 8.73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9
Denenga: Female Wages and Occupational Advance under Black Economic Empowe
Published by Digital Commons @ Colgate, 2012
  213 
 
Table IV. Summary Statistics: Province and Occupation Variables 
 
Observation by Province  
Western Cape  
Eastern Cape  
Northern Cape  
Free State  
Kwazulu – Natal  
North West 
Gauteng  
Mpumalanga  
Limpopo 
Observation by Occupation 
Legislators, senior officials and 
managers 
Professionals 
Technicians 
Clerks  
Service Workers and shop and 
market sales 
Skilled Agriculture and fishery 
worker 
Crafts and Related trade workers 
Plant machine operators 
Elementary Occupation 
Armed Forces  
Unknown 
 
 
 
252,251 
134,746 
41,248 
113,126 
253,008 
131,411 
464,947 
105, 728 
100,648 
 
81,975 
139, 363 
123,722 
148,587 
159,224 
55,902 
212,159 
140,495 
436,454 
2,990 
53,817 
 
 
15.7% 
8.44% 
2.58% 
7.08% 
15.8% 
8.23% 
29.1% 
6.62% 
6.30% 
 
5.27% 
8.96% 
7.96 % 
9.56% 
10.24% 
3.60% 
13.65% 
9.04% 
28.07% 
0.19% 
3.46% 
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Table V. Occupation Categories 
Managers Non-managers 
Legislators, Seniors and Managers Technicians and Associates 
Professionals Clerks 
 Service Workers and shop market sale 
 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 
 Crafts related trade workers 
 Plant and machine operators 
 Elementary occupations 
 Armed forces 
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Table VI. OLS Regression  
Variables I II III 
Intercept 8.78(1409)*** 8.73(1409)*** 8.75( 1192) 
Nonwhite -1.00 (-323.76)*** -0.987(-314.9)*** -0.987(-312)*** 
d2001 -0.137(-61.68)*** -0.125(60.9)*** -0.141(-64.2)*** 
d2007 0.970(107)*** 0.977((108)*** 0.986(109)*** 
nonWhite2007 -0.378(-41.31)*** -0.374(-40.8)*** -0.383(-41.9)*** 
Yrsedu 0.142(431)*** 0.139 (419)*** 0.138(415)*** 
Exper 0.0191(186)*** 0.0171(152)*** 0.0174(155)*** 
Female -0.465(195.2)*** -0.441(-182)*** -0.439(-182)*** 
female2007 0.0246(3.79)*** 0.0183(2.80)*** 0.0139(2.15)*** 
femalechu5 0.102(24.84)*** 0.0385(9.03)*** 0.0401(9.41)*** 
Rural 0.387 (155.8)*** 0.3822 (153.53) 0.340 (125)*** 
Mother  0.0436(13.12)*** 0.0401(12.08)*** 
Spouse  0.126(51.07)*** 0.123(50.20)*** 
Nchildren  0.0192(23.98)*** 0.0210(26.13)*** 
Eastc   -0.138(-24.9)*** 
Northc   -0.120(-15.7)*** 
Westc   0.102( 20.0)*** 
Fstate   -0.344(-59.8)*** 
Kwazulu   0.0436(8.75)*** 
Mpumalanga   -0.0240(-
4.16)*** 
Northw   0.0393(7.17)*** 
Gauteng   0.106(21.65)*** 
R2 
Reference group: White men 
*** 1% significance  
Level (t stats) 
0.3282 0.3303 0.3366 
 
 
 
 
 
12
Colgate Academic Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 9
http://commons.colgate.edu/car/vol9/iss1/9
  216 
Table VI. Linear Probability Model 
Variable I II III 
Intercept -0.0855(-57.9)*** -0.0831(-54.3)*** -0.0470(-25.8)*** 
Nonwhite -0.123(-160)*** -0.120(-155.7)*** -0.120(-46.9)*** 
d2001 -0.0252(46.0)*** -0.0249(-45.3)*** -0.0258(25.6)*** 
d2007 0.0560 (-25.0)*** 0.0574 (25.7)*** 0.0573 (-24.3)*** 
nonWhite2007 -0.0548 (-24.2)*** -0.0548 (-24.1)*** -0.0552 (-24.3)*** 
Yrsedu 0.0315(387)*** 0.0311(378)*** 0.0309(374)*** 
Exper 0.00345(135)*** 0.00305(109)*** 0.00302(109)*** 
Female -0.00878(-20.0)*** -0.00878(-14.7)*** -0.00928(-15.5)*** 
female2007 0.0336(21.3)*** 0.0336(21.0)*** 0.0337(21.0)*** 
femalechu5 0.0185(25.7)*** 0.0185(17.6)*** 0.0189(18.2)*** 
Rural -0.0167(-25.9)*** -0.0167(-27.1)*** -0.0128(-15.6)*** 
Mother  -0.0130(-15.9)*** -0.0130(-15.9)*** 
Spouse  0.0141(23.2)*** 0.0152(25.0)*** 
Nchildren  0.00224(11.3)*** 0.00169(8.48)*** 
Eastc   -0.0319(-23.3)*** 
Northc   -0.0484(-25.3)*** 
Westc   -0.0532(-38.2)*** 
Fstate   -0.0345(-37.2)*** 
Kwazulu   -0.0305(-27.9)*** 
Mpumalanga   -0.0372(-21.3)*** 
Northw   -0.0410(-27.4)*** 
Gauteng   -0.0469(-33.8)*** 
R2 
Reference group: White 
men 
*** 1% significance  
Level  (t stats) 
0.1659 0.1668 0.1678 
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